http://nwcarrollton.blogspot.com/2010/05/if-bp-was-capping-well-surely-flow-was.html
BP needs to pay and pay and pay and pay......
http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2012/11/3_bp_officials_face_new_crimin.html
"Rainey, who was BP America's vice president of exploration for the Gulf of Mexico, has been charged with obstruction of Congress and false statements.
Rainey, as part of the Unified Command handling the disaster, knowingly understated the amount of oil flowing from the damaged well. Later, the indictment says, he lied to Congress about those estimates.
Shortly after the explosion, the Unified Command, with BP's input, issued an estimate of 1,000 barrels per day of oil flowing from the well. Two days later, a scientist from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration estimated the flow was 5,000 barrels per day.
A group put together after public pressure regarding the oil flow estimates began to mount eventually concluded that the flow rate had initially been 62,000 barrels per day, and had fallen to 53,000 barrels per day by the time the well was shut down in July 2010, the indictment says.
The group estimated that 4.9 million barrels had been released during the course of the spill."
Showing posts with label Oil Spill. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Oil Spill. Show all posts
Friday, November 16, 2012
Sunday, October 28, 2012
Tell BP NO!
http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2012/10/bp_asks_to_abandon_plugged_con.html
"BP has asked the U.S. Coast Guard to allow it to abandon a containment dome on the bottom of the Gulf of Mexico that it capped and plugged this week after concluding it was the source of oil causing repeated sheens near the site of the company's failed Macondo well. The request was included in an exchange of e-mail messages on Sunday and Monday between James Grant, BP's Gulf regulatory compliance and environmental manager, and Coast Guard Federal On-Scene Coordinator Capt. Duke Walker. The email messages were obtained by The Times-Picayune.
The cofferdam is a metal box! Not a well. Well's are plugged and abandoned. Because it is possible to plug a well and leave the seafloor close to it's original condition. The whole reason for the cofferdam's existence was to "hold oil". The fact that BP is asking to "plug and abandon" this think that is known to leak show that BP has learned NOTHING! This metal box will, over time, leak. . They might have to "abandon it" meaning not raise it to the surface today. But BP can not "abandon it" or the responsibilities associated with it and "walk away"! BP owns the monitoring on this "box" for the lifetime of the box or until they can suck the oil from it (not likely).
"A mixture of oil and slushy methane hydrate -- a frozen form of natural gas -- is believed to have plugged the exit leading to the stovepipe at the top of the dome during the oil collection attempt. Some of the oil and frozen methane are believed to remain in the structure.
" 'BP continues to believe that abandonment of the cofferdam in place is the best course of action and presents fewer environmental and safety risks than attempting to recover it,' Grant wrote in an email message to Walker on Sunday.
Grant attached a copy of the approval the Department of Interior's Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement gave in Feb. 2011 to an earlier request to abandon the 40-foot-tall, 86-ton steel structure at its location about 1,500 feet from the Macondo well. He also included a copy of those plans, which included information about the risks involved in returning the structure to the surface, its condition at the time, and a third-party analysis of its stability on the ocean floor.
In a Thursday news release announcing approval of BP's cap-and-plug plan, the Coast Guard 'directed BP to submit a feasibility plan that considers the next steps toward either removing or remediating the threats of oil posed by the riser pipe and containment dome.'
In his Monday note to Grant, Walker's directions to the company included: 'Having temporarily mitigated this source of pollution, undertake the planning effort necessary to develop proposed courses of action to either remove or remediate the remaining sources of oil: riser pipe and the cofferdam/containment dome.' "
"BP has asked the U.S. Coast Guard to allow it to abandon a containment dome on the bottom of the Gulf of Mexico that it capped and plugged this week after concluding it was the source of oil causing repeated sheens near the site of the company's failed Macondo well. The request was included in an exchange of e-mail messages on Sunday and Monday between James Grant, BP's Gulf regulatory compliance and environmental manager, and Coast Guard Federal On-Scene Coordinator Capt. Duke Walker. The email messages were obtained by The Times-Picayune.
The cofferdam is a metal box! Not a well. Well's are plugged and abandoned. Because it is possible to plug a well and leave the seafloor close to it's original condition. The whole reason for the cofferdam's existence was to "hold oil". The fact that BP is asking to "plug and abandon" this think that is known to leak show that BP has learned NOTHING! This metal box will, over time, leak. . They might have to "abandon it" meaning not raise it to the surface today. But BP can not "abandon it" or the responsibilities associated with it and "walk away"! BP owns the monitoring on this "box" for the lifetime of the box or until they can suck the oil from it (not likely).
"A mixture of oil and slushy methane hydrate -- a frozen form of natural gas -- is believed to have plugged the exit leading to the stovepipe at the top of the dome during the oil collection attempt. Some of the oil and frozen methane are believed to remain in the structure.
" 'BP continues to believe that abandonment of the cofferdam in place is the best course of action and presents fewer environmental and safety risks than attempting to recover it,' Grant wrote in an email message to Walker on Sunday.
Grant attached a copy of the approval the Department of Interior's Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement gave in Feb. 2011 to an earlier request to abandon the 40-foot-tall, 86-ton steel structure at its location about 1,500 feet from the Macondo well. He also included a copy of those plans, which included information about the risks involved in returning the structure to the surface, its condition at the time, and a third-party analysis of its stability on the ocean floor.
In a Thursday news release announcing approval of BP's cap-and-plug plan, the Coast Guard 'directed BP to submit a feasibility plan that considers the next steps toward either removing or remediating the threats of oil posed by the riser pipe and containment dome.'
In his Monday note to Grant, Walker's directions to the company included: 'Having temporarily mitigated this source of pollution, undertake the planning effort necessary to develop proposed courses of action to either remove or remediate the remaining sources of oil: riser pipe and the cofferdam/containment dome.' "
Monday, December 27, 2010
Somebody gets it...
There are ways to put a value on that bartered shrimp: A guest column by Douglas A. Kysar
Published: Thursday, December 23, 2010, 3:36 PM
In the classic law school novel, "The Paper Chase," Professor Charles W. Kingsfield, Jr. personifies everything that is frustrating and obscure about the law. Memorably portrayed on-screen by John Houseman, Professor Kingsfield relentlessly pushes and criticizes his students in an effort to teach them how to "think like a lawyer." If reports out of the Gulf are to be believed, Kenneth Feinberg is staging his own re-enactment of "The Paper Chase," starring himself as the exacting professor and victims of the BP oil spill as his unwitting students.
In his role as chief administrator of the Gulf Coast Claims Facility -- the $20 billion fund established by BP to compensate individuals and businesses affected by the Deepwater Horizon disaster -- Feinberg faces the difficult challenge of offering speedy and fair compensation to hundreds of thousands of claimants without also rewarding false claims. So far, Feinberg seems to be erring on the side of denying valid claims, perhaps to make good on his prediction that the money set aside by BP will be more than enough to compensate all eligible victims.
The most worrisome example of this tendency is Feinberg's treatment of subsistence use claims by the Vietnamese-American fishing community. Members of this community have been hit particularly hard by the spill. Up to one-third of the Gulf Coast fishing industry is Vietnamese-American and more than half of Vietnamese-Americans in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama are dependent on the fishing industry for their livelihoods.
But members of this community don't just depend on the industry for a paycheck. They also typically hold back a small portion of their catch or harvest for "subsistence use."
Rather than sell this portion in the market, they reserve it for their own consumption, for sharing with relatives and neighbors or for bartering with other members of their community. And these practices aren't just about eating shrimp and oysters -- they are about strengthening and preserving culture.
Subsistence use claims of this sort are clearly eligible for compensation under the federal Oil Pollution Act, yet Feinberg has indicated little interest in recognizing them.
Why? One concern might be valuation: How does one put a price on practices that are specifically intended to happen outside of the economic market? After the spill, Vietnamese Americans couldn't just go to the supermarket to replace what was lost. A major point of subsistence use is that members of the community become reciprocally dependent on each other, rather than on some anonymous supermarket chain.
This might sound like a law school exam question, but it's really not that hard. The legal system faces a similar dilemma every time someone is compensated in money for wrongful loss of life or limb. There may be no right answer to the question, "How much money is a life worth?", but there is definitely one wrong answer: zero.
By denying subsistence use claims, Feinberg suggests that the value of the Vietnamese American community's cultural practices is zero. He should instead look to market replacement cost or some other admittedly imperfect proxy. After all, it's better to be vaguely right than precisely wrong.
Feinberg might also be concerned about documentation. Admittedly, with $20 billion on the table, the Claims Facility is likely to attract speculative or even fraudulent claims. But any historian or social worker knowledgeable about the Vietnamese American fishing community will attest to the prevalence and significance of subsistence use.
Feinberg seems to think that these losses can be proven through formal receipts or legal documents. That expectation is misguided when the loss at issue is specifically intended to avoid formality and legality. The very meaning of subsistence use to the Vietnamese-American community would change if it required elaborate paperwork and accounting ledgers.
For Feinberg to deny these claims because they don't leave a paper trail like "normal" claims adds insult to injury.
All of this should be obvious to Feinberg. It should also be obvious that if the Claims Facility insists on the same level of paperwork and exactitude as the legal system, then the whole reason for having an alternative to the legal system will disappear. The people of the Gulf have seen enough disappear in recent years.
Douglas A. Kysar, Joseph M. Field '55 Professor of Law at Yale Law School, is the author of "Regulating from Nowhere: Environmental Law and the Search for Objectivity" (Yale University Press). His e-mail address is douglas.kysar@yale.edu.
Published: Thursday, December 23, 2010, 3:36 PM
In the classic law school novel, "The Paper Chase," Professor Charles W. Kingsfield, Jr. personifies everything that is frustrating and obscure about the law. Memorably portrayed on-screen by John Houseman, Professor Kingsfield relentlessly pushes and criticizes his students in an effort to teach them how to "think like a lawyer." If reports out of the Gulf are to be believed, Kenneth Feinberg is staging his own re-enactment of "The Paper Chase," starring himself as the exacting professor and victims of the BP oil spill as his unwitting students.
In his role as chief administrator of the Gulf Coast Claims Facility -- the $20 billion fund established by BP to compensate individuals and businesses affected by the Deepwater Horizon disaster -- Feinberg faces the difficult challenge of offering speedy and fair compensation to hundreds of thousands of claimants without also rewarding false claims. So far, Feinberg seems to be erring on the side of denying valid claims, perhaps to make good on his prediction that the money set aside by BP will be more than enough to compensate all eligible victims.
The most worrisome example of this tendency is Feinberg's treatment of subsistence use claims by the Vietnamese-American fishing community. Members of this community have been hit particularly hard by the spill. Up to one-third of the Gulf Coast fishing industry is Vietnamese-American and more than half of Vietnamese-Americans in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama are dependent on the fishing industry for their livelihoods.
But members of this community don't just depend on the industry for a paycheck. They also typically hold back a small portion of their catch or harvest for "subsistence use."
Rather than sell this portion in the market, they reserve it for their own consumption, for sharing with relatives and neighbors or for bartering with other members of their community. And these practices aren't just about eating shrimp and oysters -- they are about strengthening and preserving culture.
Subsistence use claims of this sort are clearly eligible for compensation under the federal Oil Pollution Act, yet Feinberg has indicated little interest in recognizing them.
Why? One concern might be valuation: How does one put a price on practices that are specifically intended to happen outside of the economic market? After the spill, Vietnamese Americans couldn't just go to the supermarket to replace what was lost. A major point of subsistence use is that members of the community become reciprocally dependent on each other, rather than on some anonymous supermarket chain.
This might sound like a law school exam question, but it's really not that hard. The legal system faces a similar dilemma every time someone is compensated in money for wrongful loss of life or limb. There may be no right answer to the question, "How much money is a life worth?", but there is definitely one wrong answer: zero.
By denying subsistence use claims, Feinberg suggests that the value of the Vietnamese American community's cultural practices is zero. He should instead look to market replacement cost or some other admittedly imperfect proxy. After all, it's better to be vaguely right than precisely wrong.
Feinberg might also be concerned about documentation. Admittedly, with $20 billion on the table, the Claims Facility is likely to attract speculative or even fraudulent claims. But any historian or social worker knowledgeable about the Vietnamese American fishing community will attest to the prevalence and significance of subsistence use.
Feinberg seems to think that these losses can be proven through formal receipts or legal documents. That expectation is misguided when the loss at issue is specifically intended to avoid formality and legality. The very meaning of subsistence use to the Vietnamese-American community would change if it required elaborate paperwork and accounting ledgers.
For Feinberg to deny these claims because they don't leave a paper trail like "normal" claims adds insult to injury.
All of this should be obvious to Feinberg. It should also be obvious that if the Claims Facility insists on the same level of paperwork and exactitude as the legal system, then the whole reason for having an alternative to the legal system will disappear. The people of the Gulf have seen enough disappear in recent years.
Douglas A. Kysar, Joseph M. Field '55 Professor of Law at Yale Law School, is the author of "Regulating from Nowhere: Environmental Law and the Search for Objectivity" (Yale University Press). His e-mail address is douglas.kysar@yale.edu.
Tuesday, June 15, 2010
Makin' Groceries Not OIL* A Benefit For Our Local Fishers
Jack & Jake's presents...
*Makin' Groceries Not OIL* A Benefit For Our Local Fishers*
We are looking for local businesses to help us put this event on for those
in immediate need. We need restaurants to provide food and drink samples
(~300 samples/vendor). Live music and free wine and beer will be provided.
The event is scheduled for Sat June 26th 7-10 PM at the future home of Jack
& Jake's 8300 Earhart Blvd.
Justin Pitts donated a pig and Cochon will cook it up for the event! Look for Patois, Crescent Pie & Sausage, Meltdown Pops, La Divina, St. James Cheese Company, Chef Esses, and more..
Jack & Jake's
8300 Earhart Blvd.
New Orleans, Louisiana 70118
w: jackandjakes.com
c: 504.390.9640
e: jack@jackandjakes.com
*Makin' Groceries Not OIL* A Benefit For Our Local Fishers*
We are looking for local businesses to help us put this event on for those
in immediate need. We need restaurants to provide food and drink samples
(~300 samples/vendor). Live music and free wine and beer will be provided.
The event is scheduled for Sat June 26th 7-10 PM at the future home of Jack
& Jake's 8300 Earhart Blvd.
Justin Pitts donated a pig and Cochon will cook it up for the event! Look for Patois, Crescent Pie & Sausage, Meltdown Pops, La Divina, St. James Cheese Company, Chef Esses, and more..
Jack & Jake's
8300 Earhart Blvd.
New Orleans, Louisiana 70118
w: jackandjakes.com
c: 504.390.9640
e: jack@jackandjakes.com
Saturday, May 29, 2010
Oil Spill & Environmental Education
Please watch this C-Span video interview.
I think it best represents how people from south Louisiana feel about what is going on with the BP Oil Spill and the Federal Response.
Garland Robinette has spent decades educating himself and others on the importance of our wetlands.
I also highly recommend that you listen to Garland's open letter to the President after the presidential visit on May May 27th.
This is website offers a great overview of the technical details.
I think it best represents how people from south Louisiana feel about what is going on with the BP Oil Spill and the Federal Response.
Garland Robinette has spent decades educating himself and others on the importance of our wetlands.
I also highly recommend that you listen to Garland's open letter to the President after the presidential visit on May May 27th.
This is website offers a great overview of the technical details.
Wednesday, May 5, 2010
If BP was capping well, surely flow was known: A letter to the editor
May 5th Letter to Editor
Re: "Leaking crude 'has the potential to be a major spill'," Page 1, April 23.
Reported in The Times-Picayune: "'Immediately before the fire, the rig's crew was cementing a cap on an 18,000-foot-deep well that was to be abandoned and later tied into production facilities,' said Adrian Rose, Transocean vice president."
If this is true, BP should have hard estimates as to what the test flow rates were before the capping began. BP should also know what the anticipated flow rates on the production well would have been and how long they could expect to produce from the reservoir. Drilling an 18,000-foot well in 5,000 feet of water means that BP had lots of detail on what to expect.
BP should also have samples of oil from the reservoir that could provide detail on the type of oil in the spill. Why aren't these numbers and data on oil samples from well test reports out in the public and being used to inform recovery activities?
I'm sure BP is telling the truth in a "letter of the law" fashion when their spokespersons say they don't know how much oil is spilling out of the well. But if they were in the stage The Times-Picayune reported, then there is the opportunity to be more specific about the volume and potential risks.
Not sharing this kind of information tells me there is the chance that BP is more concerned about proprietary information on the reservoir then they are about recovery and cleanup efforts.
Jenel Hazlett
New Orleans
Re: "Leaking crude 'has the potential to be a major spill'," Page 1, April 23.
Reported in The Times-Picayune: "'Immediately before the fire, the rig's crew was cementing a cap on an 18,000-foot-deep well that was to be abandoned and later tied into production facilities,' said Adrian Rose, Transocean vice president."
If this is true, BP should have hard estimates as to what the test flow rates were before the capping began. BP should also know what the anticipated flow rates on the production well would have been and how long they could expect to produce from the reservoir. Drilling an 18,000-foot well in 5,000 feet of water means that BP had lots of detail on what to expect.
BP should also have samples of oil from the reservoir that could provide detail on the type of oil in the spill. Why aren't these numbers and data on oil samples from well test reports out in the public and being used to inform recovery activities?
I'm sure BP is telling the truth in a "letter of the law" fashion when their spokespersons say they don't know how much oil is spilling out of the well. But if they were in the stage The Times-Picayune reported, then there is the opportunity to be more specific about the volume and potential risks.
Not sharing this kind of information tells me there is the chance that BP is more concerned about proprietary information on the reservoir then they are about recovery and cleanup efforts.
Jenel Hazlett
New Orleans
Tuesday, May 4, 2010
Oil Spill evaulation
From JB,
During my youth I was a drilling engineer and thought the comments below may interest you and future news will judge its validity. Please note I am the dinosaur in the new era of mammals with regard cutting edge technology. However, as you clearly practice, logical first principles should remain relevant.
I have based my conjecture on this article:
http://www.rigzone.com/news/article.asp?a_id=92021
Points of interest:
“Production string” – suggests it was the 7” or 5” casing that was cemented.
“Halliburton had completed the cementing of the final production casing string in accordance with the well design approximately 20 hours prior to the incident” – they are implying they pressure tests to determine zonal isolation to “industry” standards were done satisfactorily AND 20 hours was enough time to assume the cement set properly. Plus the BP drilling engineer approved the design and program then signed off. Halliburton is preparing their legal liability defense.
Please note Halliburton was also responsible for the cementing of the last year's huge West Australia spill. Root cause of this spill was determined (and reported on MARCH 15, 2010) to be .... wait for it..... Failure to test a cement casing .... hmmmm.
“At the time of the incident, well operations had not yet reached the point requiring the placement of the final cement plug…” – the fly in the ointment detrimental to Halliburton.
Halliburton cementation engineers on the Montara Well Blowout in Western Australia was inept in calculating volume and the Oil Company’s drilling program planning bad because the rig had no properly sized blowout preventers (BOP) on board when the accident occurred.
It’s obvious the BOP on the Deepwater Horizon failed because it could not control the “gas kick”.
All oil rigs, when they begin, have this explosive blow out potential because the gases are trapped for many eons and will escape very suddenly if there is any break in the salt overlays that often seal off offshore oil and gas fields. Most of these carbon deposits are ancient dead sea life and so, are often sealed by water evaporating during various warming cycles of our planet and then covered with mud layers when the oceans rise during cooling phases. And yes, our planet sees many such cycles, it doesn’t have any theoretical ‘stable point’ but rather, is a pendulum that swings back and forth.
My speculation:
The cement slurry design may have been ok for the job when argued against data for other wells drilled in the area – but not conclusively proven. What is real the gas got thru. I assume the well was drilled underbalanced drilling system because deep wells in deep water have complicated parameters.
The sequence of events suggests human error.
It is possible the cleaning of the formation surface was inadequate (therefore nuisance gas channel flows occurred to compromise zonal isolation);
Perhaps the wiper plug did not work well enough to clear the “mud” thereby compromising zonal integrity.
I am inclined to argue the slurry design was not good enough and this raises the question on what down-hole measurements and logs were used to analyse the formation to be cemented?
Why did the BOP fail? Was incorrect sizing, lack of equipment maintenance, bad design?
Some Technical background:
Deep water drilling generally creates unique problems because of the following:
. The subsurface and deepwater depth (with its greater number of geological formations and the hydrostatic weight of the sea column) of the intended well may force the driller to set large diameter casing in poorly consolidated formations or zones. These types of formations generally have a narrow pore-fracture pressure window with a high potential for shallow-flow water or gas hazard (formation fluid or gas easily flows out of the formation into the annulus.
· The low temperature at the sea bottom and the first several thousand meters below the surface or mudline.
· Then there are the mechanical complications because the subsea wellhead (resting on the seafloor) makes launching cement wiper plugs (plug to wipe mud off internal inner diameter of casing + push the cement downhole because the wiper plug is pushed downhole by mud with cement below the wiper) etc difficult. Plus the subsea well head makes any remedial work more difficult.
· Abnormally pressured sands, with high probability shallow-surface water/gas flows is typical problem. Uncontrolled shallow flows in the cementing affect the integrity of the well. Such uncontrolled shallow flows are:- subsidence, compromised seafloor stability, loss of well support and buckling of structural casing, compromised well bore integrity etc.
During my youth I was a drilling engineer and thought the comments below may interest you and future news will judge its validity. Please note I am the dinosaur in the new era of mammals with regard cutting edge technology. However, as you clearly practice, logical first principles should remain relevant.
I have based my conjecture on this article:
http://www.rigzone.com/news/article.asp?a_id=92021
Points of interest:
“Production string” – suggests it was the 7” or 5” casing that was cemented.
“Halliburton had completed the cementing of the final production casing string in accordance with the well design approximately 20 hours prior to the incident” – they are implying they pressure tests to determine zonal isolation to “industry” standards were done satisfactorily AND 20 hours was enough time to assume the cement set properly. Plus the BP drilling engineer approved the design and program then signed off. Halliburton is preparing their legal liability defense.
Please note Halliburton was also responsible for the cementing of the last year's huge West Australia spill. Root cause of this spill was determined (and reported on MARCH 15, 2010) to be .... wait for it..... Failure to test a cement casing .... hmmmm.
“At the time of the incident, well operations had not yet reached the point requiring the placement of the final cement plug…” – the fly in the ointment detrimental to Halliburton.
Halliburton cementation engineers on the Montara Well Blowout in Western Australia was inept in calculating volume and the Oil Company’s drilling program planning bad because the rig had no properly sized blowout preventers (BOP) on board when the accident occurred.
It’s obvious the BOP on the Deepwater Horizon failed because it could not control the “gas kick”.
All oil rigs, when they begin, have this explosive blow out potential because the gases are trapped for many eons and will escape very suddenly if there is any break in the salt overlays that often seal off offshore oil and gas fields. Most of these carbon deposits are ancient dead sea life and so, are often sealed by water evaporating during various warming cycles of our planet and then covered with mud layers when the oceans rise during cooling phases. And yes, our planet sees many such cycles, it doesn’t have any theoretical ‘stable point’ but rather, is a pendulum that swings back and forth.
My speculation:
The cement slurry design may have been ok for the job when argued against data for other wells drilled in the area – but not conclusively proven. What is real the gas got thru. I assume the well was drilled underbalanced drilling system because deep wells in deep water have complicated parameters.
The sequence of events suggests human error.
It is possible the cleaning of the formation surface was inadequate (therefore nuisance gas channel flows occurred to compromise zonal isolation);
Perhaps the wiper plug did not work well enough to clear the “mud” thereby compromising zonal integrity.
I am inclined to argue the slurry design was not good enough and this raises the question on what down-hole measurements and logs were used to analyse the formation to be cemented?
Why did the BOP fail? Was incorrect sizing, lack of equipment maintenance, bad design?
Some Technical background:
Deep water drilling generally creates unique problems because of the following:
. The subsurface and deepwater depth (with its greater number of geological formations and the hydrostatic weight of the sea column) of the intended well may force the driller to set large diameter casing in poorly consolidated formations or zones. These types of formations generally have a narrow pore-fracture pressure window with a high potential for shallow-flow water or gas hazard (formation fluid or gas easily flows out of the formation into the annulus.
· The low temperature at the sea bottom and the first several thousand meters below the surface or mudline.
· Then there are the mechanical complications because the subsea wellhead (resting on the seafloor) makes launching cement wiper plugs (plug to wipe mud off internal inner diameter of casing + push the cement downhole because the wiper plug is pushed downhole by mud with cement below the wiper) etc difficult. Plus the subsea well head makes any remedial work more difficult.
· Abnormally pressured sands, with high probability shallow-surface water/gas flows is typical problem. Uncontrolled shallow flows in the cementing affect the integrity of the well. Such uncontrolled shallow flows are:- subsidence, compromised seafloor stability, loss of well support and buckling of structural casing, compromised well bore integrity etc.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)